Category Archives: Kidney

Ethical Incentives — Not Payment — For Organ Donation

Since this article has no abstract, we have provided an extract of the first 100 words of the full text and any section headings.

The therapeutic promise of transplanting organs from cadavericdonors, as envisioned by the pioneers of transplantation,1 hasnever been realized because the demand for cadaveric organshas far exceeded the supply. The waiting list for organ transplantscontinues to grow, and in 2000, nearly 5000 patients were removedfrom the list because of death.2 Consequently, many patientswith end-stage organ failure are no longer relying solely onthe waiting list. Instead, they are turning to spouses, friends,or strangers as possible donors — a medically acceptablealternative because advances in immunosuppression have eliminatedthe requirement of a genetic match for . . .

The Market for Transplantable Tissues and Organs

New Congressional Legislation

Ethical Incentives to Increase Organ Donation

Donor Medal of Honor

Reimbursement for Funeral Expenses

Organ Exchanges

Medical Leave for Organ Donation

Ensuring Access to Organs for Previous Donors

Donor Insurance

A Regulated Market System

Incentives versus Payment

References

Related Letters:

Ethical Incentives — Not Payment — for Organ Donation
Mosimann F., Matas A. J., Spital A., Delmonico F. L., Arnold R., Youngner S. J.
Extract | Full Text | PDF
N Engl J Med 2002; 347:1382-1384, Oct 24, 2002. Correspondence

This article has been cited by other articles:

  • Koh, H. K., Jacobson, M. D., Lyddy, A. M., O’Connor, K. J., Fitzpatrick, S. M., Krakow, M., Judge, C. M., Alpert, H. R., Luskin, R. S. (2007). A Statewide Public Health Approach to Improving Organ Donation: The Massachusetts Organ Donation Initiative. Am. J. Public Health 97: 30-36 [Abstract] [Full Text]
  • Matas, A. J. (2006). Why We Should Develop a Regulated System of Kidney Sales: A Call for Action!. CJASN 1: 1129-1132 [Full Text]
  • Ghods, A. J., Savaj, S. (2006). Iranian Model of Paid and Regulated Living-Unrelated Kidney Donation. CJASN 1: 1136-1145 [Abstract] [Full Text]
  • Siegal, G., Bonnie, R. J. (2006). Closing the Organ Gap: A Reciprocity-Based Social Contract Approach. J Law Med Ethics 34: 415-423
  • Kunin, J D (2005). The search for organs: halachic perspectives on altruistic giving and the selling of organs. J. Med. Ethics 31: 269-272 [Abstract] [Full Text]
  • Giles, S (2005). An antidote to the emerging two tier organ donation policy in Canada: the Public Cadaveric Organ Donation Program. J. Med. Ethics 31: 188-191 [Abstract] [Full Text]
  • Scheper-Hughes, N. (2004). Parts unknown: Undercover ethnography of the organs-trafficking underworld. Ethnography 5: 29-73 [Abstract]
  • Wendler, D., Emanuel, E. (2004). Assessing the Ethical and Practical Wisdom of Surrogate Consent for Living Organ Donation. JAMA 291: 732-735 [Full Text]
  • Beauchamp, T L (2003). Methods and principles in biomedical ethics. J. Med. Ethics 29: 269-274 [Abstract] [Full Text]
  • Douglas, D. D. (2003). Rebuttal by Dr Douglas. Arch Intern Med 163: 1885-1886 [Full Text]
  • Mosimann, F., Matas, A. J., Spital, A., Delmonico, F. L., Arnold, R., Youngner, S. J. (2002). Ethical Incentives — Not Payment — for Organ Donation. NEJM 347: 1382-1384 [Full Text]
  • Goyal, M., Mehta, R. L., Schneiderman, L. J., Sehgal, A. R. (2002). Economic and Health Consequences of Selling a Kidney in India. JAMA 288: 1589-1593 [Abstract] [Full Text]
  • Rothman, D. J. (2002). Ethical and Social Consequences of Selling a Kidney. JAMA 288: 1640-1641 [Full Text]
  • Ramos, E., Aoun, S., Harmon, W. E. (2002). Expanding the Donor Pool: Effect on Graft Outcome. J. Am. Soc. Nephrol. 13: 2590-2599 [Full Text]

Amendment of the Human Organ Transplant Act

On 6 January 2004, the Human Organ Transplant Act (HOTA) was amended to allow more Singaporeans to benefit from organ donation. The main amendments to HOTA were (a) to extend HOTA beyond kidneys to include livers, hearts and corneas; (b) to extend HOTA beyond deaths due to accidents to include all causes of deaths; and (c) to extend HOTA beyond cadaveric organdonation to also regulate living donor organ transplants. In this article, we review the amendments to HOTA and the Interpretation (Determination and Certification of Death) Regulationsand examine the impact of HOTA on organ procurement and transplantation in Singapore.Ann Acad Med Singapore 2006;35:428-3

Kidney transplants have been carried out in Singapore
for more than 35 years, with the first cadaveric kidney
transplant operation performed on 8 July 1970.
1
However,
prior to the commencement of the Human Organ Transplant
Act (HOTA) in 1988, there was only a small number of
kidney transplants; between 1970 and 1987, only 85
cadaveric kidney transplants were carried out using kidneys
procured from local donors in Singapore.
2
There are 2 laws pertaining to organ donation in Singapore
– the Medical (Therapy, Education and Research) Act
(MTERA) and HOTA. A third set of legislation, the
Interpretation Act, provides the criteria for determining
death. It allows for death to be defined in terms of cardiac
death or brain death. The Interpretation (Determination
and Certification of Death) Regulations provide further
conditions and criteria for the determination and certification
of brain death.
MTERA was passed by Parliament in 1973. It provides
for a person to pledge to donate his organs upon his death
for the purposes of therapy (including transplant), education
or research. Where a deceased person has not made any
indication of his intent to donate, MTERA also provides for
the relatives to donate the body or body parts of the
deceased person for the above purposes. Between 1973 and
1987, cadaveric kidneys for transplant were obtained either
under MTERA, or from overseas.
HOTA was introduced in 1987, as a presumed consent
law that allowed for the removal of kidneys for the purpose
of organ transplantation from those who died in a hospital
as a result of accidents, and did not object to organ donation
prior to their death. It applied to Singapore citizens and
permanent residents between the ages of 21 and 60 years.
Muslims were excluded from HOTA because of religious
reasons. Persons who were of unsound mind were also
excluded from HOTA. Persons who objected to organ
donation could opt not to donate their organs by registering
their objections with the National Organ Transplant Unit
(NOTU), a central national registry overseen by the Director
of Medical Services.
Several safeguards were provided for under HOTA.
First, the designated officer of the hospital had to ensure
that the necessary criteria required under HOTA were met
and provide his written authorisation before the organs
could be removed from a deceased person. The designated
officer had to be a senior doctor appointed by the Director
of Medical Services. Second, only medical practitioners
who had been authorised by the Director of Medical
Services could remove the organs from a deceased person
under HOTA and transplant these organs. Third, organ
trading was strictly prohibited.
Impact of HOTA
The introduction of HOTA resulted in more cadaveric
kidneys being available for transplantation.
3
Between 1970
and 1987, there was an average of 4.7 cadaveric kidney
transplants per annum. Between 1988 and 30 June 2004,
there was a total of 674 cadaveric kidney transplants or an
average of 40.8 cadaveric kidney transplants per annum
(Fig. 1). Of these, 13.5 cadaveric kidney transplants per
annum were obtained through HOTA during this period.
Necessity for Amendments to HOTA
When HOTA was first introduced, a conservative
approach was taken as Singaporeans were unfamiliar with
the concept of organ donation and there was cultural
reluctance to donate organs. HOTA was thus restricted to
only kidneys and death due to accidents. In addition, the
other types of organ transplant were not yet well developed
in Singapore.
However, with an increasing number of patients requiring
transplants, there was a need to review and revise HOTA
to alleviate the demand for more organs, including kidneys
as well as other vital organs such as the heart and liver. At
the same time, there was also a need to put in place an
effective regulatory framework for living donor organ
transplants, which till then had not been subject to any
legislative purview, even though the first living donor
kidney transplant in Singapore was carried out in 1976.
Although the Ministry of Health had established professional
guidelines stipulating that the social, psychological and
emotional profile of the donor had to be assessed, a full
medical examination carried out, and informed consent
taken, there was no legislation supporting these
requirements.
Demand for More Organs
Whilst the introduction of HOTA in 1987 had made more
cadaveric kidneys available for transplantation, this effect
was far outstripped by the growth in demand for kidneys,
as evidenced by the continued growth of the kidney
transplant waiting list. In 1988, there were 208 end-stage renal failure patients on the kidney transplant waiting list.
By end 2003, the waiting list had increased to 673 end-
stage renal failure patients (Fig. 2).
Likewise, there was also a shortage of livers and hearts
available for transplant. The first liver transplant and the
first heart transplant were only carried out in Singapore in
1990,
4,5
and hence liver and heart had not been included in
HOTA when it was first introduced in 1987. The organ
shortage resulted in a small number of liver and heart
transplants being carried out in Singapore. Between 1998
and 2003, there was only an average of 7.3 liver transplants
per annum and 1.8 heart transplants per annum. Due to the
shortage of organs, an average of 14.7 patients per
annum died while waiting for a liver transplant, and 2.7
patients per annum died while waiting for a heart transplant
(Table 1).
With regard to cornea transplants, Singapore relied heavily
on imported corneas, mainly from the United States of
America. Between 1998 and 2002, there were 861 cornea
transplants carried out in Singapore, of which 363 (42%)
transplants involved imported corneas. As imported corneas
might not be of optimal quality because of the long transit
time between the country of origin and Singapore, there
was a need to increase the local supply of corneas.
Amendments to HOTA
Following extensive public consultations spanning
January to September 2003, the HOTA Amendment Bill
was debated over 2 days in Parliament and passed
unanimously on 6 January 2004. The amendments to
HOTA were:
a. to extend HOTA beyond kidneys to include the liver,
heart and cornea;
b. to extend HOTA beyond death due to accidents to all
causes of death; and
c. to extend HOTA beyond cadaveric organ donation to
include living donor organ transplants.
The regulation of living donor organ transplants was
achieved through the addition of Sections 15A to 15D to
HOTA. These provided for the appointments and functions
of hospital Transplant Ethics Committees (TECs), and
required all living (both related and unrelated) donor organ
transplants to have prior written authorisation from the
TEC. The considerations of the TEC, in deciding whether
to approve an application of a living donor organ transplant
were to include whether there was (a) informed consent
from the donor, (b) presence of any form of organ trading,
or (c) presence of any “fraud, duress or undue influence”
when the informed consent was obtained from the donor.
In addition, the TEC was to “have regard to the
considerations of public interest and community values”,
to allow the TEC the breadth to take into account the
dynamic nature of societal expectations in a rapidly changing
medical arena.
Amendments to the Interpretation (Certification and
Determination of Death) Regulations
The Interpretation (Determination and Certification of
Death) Regulations were also amended to allow for the use
of supplementary tests in the determination of brain death.
The supplementary tests provided for were: (a) cerebral
angiography to confirm that there was no intracranial blood
flow; and (b) radionuclide scan to confirm that there was no
intracranial perfusion.
Impact of the Amended Human Organ Transplant Act
The revised HOTA came into effect on 1 July 2004.
Between 1 July 2004 and 30 June 2005, there was a total of
24 cadaveric organ donors, making available for
transplantation a total of 47 kidneys, 5 livers, 3 hearts and
33 corneas. Twenty-one donors (87.5%) came under HOTA,
while the other 3 donors came under MTERA. Among the
21 HOTA donors, 5 donors (23.8%) had deaths due to
accidents, while 16 donors (76.2%) had non-accidental
causes of death (Table 2). Supplementary tests were used
during brain death certification for 6 cadaveric organ
donors. Thus, the number of HOTA kidneys since the
amendment of HOTA has risen to 41 over the preceding
year. This compares to 13.5 cadaveric kidney transplants
per annum obtained through HOTA prior to the
amendments.
Discussion
The introduction of HOTA in 1988 led to an increase in
the number of cadaveric kidneys available for transplant.

This was similar to the experience in other countries with
presumed consent legislation.
6,7
However, despite the
increase in availability of organs, demand continued to
outstrip supply, with the waiting list for cadaveric kidneys
more than tripling between 1998 and 2003.
In the first year that it was implemented, the revised
HOTA resulted in an increase in the number of cadaveric
organs for transplant. Of the 21 cadaveric organ donors
who came under HOTA, 16 donors died from non-accidental
causes of death. Prior to the extension of HOTA beyond
deaths due to accidents to include all causes of death, those
who died from non-accidental causes of death would not
have been included under HOTA. Instead, organ donation
would have come under MTERA and would have required
consent from the donor’s family. Based on Sheehy et al’s
estimation of a consent rate of 54% for organ donation
8
and
NOTU’s estimate of a consent rate of 30% to 35% in
Singapore (personal communication with Ms Sally Kong,
Senior Manager, NOTU), it can be estimated that the
amended HOTA resulted in an additional 8 to 11 cadaveric
donors in its first year of operation.
The provision for supplementary tests under the
Interpretation (Determination and Certification of Death)
Regulations is likely to have also contributed to the increased
number of organ donors. If supplementary tests were not
available, the 6 donors where supplementary tests were
used might not have actualised as it might not have been
possible to perform some of the tests for brain death
certification, or the potential donor’s condition might have
deteriorated while waiting for the drug titres of depressant
drugs to go down.
Various factors have been suggested as possible
determinants of the organ donation rate in a country.
9,10
In
carrying out our policy review, we considered the possible
impact of these factors on the yield of organs. As HOTA
was originally limited to deaths due to accidents, we
examined the relationship between the number of deaths
due to accidents among Singaporeans and permanent
residents between the ages of 21 years and 60 years, and the
number of cadaveric kidneys obtained through HOTA. We
found no correlation between the number of accidents and
the number of cadaveric kidney transplants (Fig. 3).
Nonetheless, the lower yield of actualised donors over the
years could have been due to more accident victims either
dying at the site of the accident, or surviving due to better
management in the intensive care units at the hospitals.
With regard to the low organ donor rate in 2002, of the 8
potential HOTA donors identified, 5 potential donors
could not be actualised because they were found to be
medically unsuitable. The absence of any HOTA donors in
2003 is likely to be due to the impact of SARS and the
related policies implemented for infection control purposes.
200
180
160
140
120
No. of cadaveric kidney transplants
No. of deaths due to accidents
0
5
10
15
20
25
2002
2003
2000
1998
1993
1995
1996
1997
1991
1989
1994
2004
2001
1999
1992
1990
Fig. 3. Scatterplot of number of deaths due to accidents among Singaporeans
and permanent residents aged 21 to 60 years, and the number of cadaveric
kidney transplants obtained through HOTA, 1988-2004.
Source: Ministry of Health, Registry of Birth & Death and NOTU
There was extensive public consultation before we
proceeded with the amendments to HOTA. There are many
ethical and societal concerns with regard to presumed
consent legislation for organ donation
11-14
and it was
extremely important to take into consideration societal
views on organ donation and presumed consent legislation.
The public consultation on the proposed amendments to
HOTA spanned 9 months and the views of all major
religious groups, as well as various community and
professional groups were sought before the HOTA
amendment bill was presented and debated in Parliament.
There were also extensive public education campaigns
before and after the passage of the HOTA amendment bill
to inform the public of the amendments to HOTA as well
as organ donation.
In conclusion, based on the first-year experience, the
amended HOTA has helped to increase the yield of cadaveric
organs for transplantation. The kidney transplant waiting
list has also begun to shorten. Nonetheless, the organ
donation rates in Singapore still lag behind those in many
countries such as Spain, the United States and the United
Kingdom. The transplant community in Singapore will
need to identify further avenues to enhance the organ
transplant programme. In particular, we will need to explore
how the number of living donor organ transplants can be
enhanced to increase the supply of organs. The
implementation of a robust regulatory framework for living
donor organ transplants will thus allow us to move forward
with greater confidence in promoting living organ
transplants, thereby saving the lives of more patients.
Acknowledgement
We are indebted to Ms Sally Kong and Ms Ang Siang Eng, National Organ
Transplant Unit, for their assistance with the transplant data

REFERENCES
1. Rauff A. Renal transplantation in Singapore – a brief historical perspective.
Ann Acad Med Singapore 1991;20:556-8.
2. Soh P, Lim SM, Tan EC. Organ procurement in Singapore. Ann Acad
Med Singapore 1991;20:439-42.
3. Lim SM, Soh P, Woo KT, Rauff A. Organ donation in Singapore.
Transplant Proc 1990;22:2179-80.
4. Wai CT, Lo SK, Lee KH, Tan CK, Aw MM, Quak SH, et al. Ten years
of experience of liver transplantation in Singapore. Transplant Proc
2000;32:2139.
5. Sivathasan C. Experience with cyclosporine in heart transplantation.
Transplant Proc 2004;36:346S-348S.
6. Roels L, Coosemans W, Christiaens MR, Waer M, Vanrenterghem Y.
The relative impact of legislative incentives on multi-organ donation
rates in Europe. Transplant Proc 1995;27:795-6.
7. Michielsen P. Presumed consent to organ donation: 10 years’ experience
in Belgium. J R Soc Med 1996;89:663-6.
8. Sheehy E, Conrad SL, Brigham LE, Luskin R, Weber R, Eakin M, et al.
Estimating the number of potential organ donors in the United States. N
Engl J Med 2003;349:667-74.
9. Gridelli B, Remuzzi G. Strategies for making more organs available for
transplantation. N Engl J Med 2000;343:404-10.
10. Matesanz R. Factors that influence the development of an organ donation
program. Transplant Proc 2004;36:739-41.
11. Kennedy I, Sells RA, Daar AS, Guttmann RD, Hoffenberg R, Lock M,
et al. The case for “presumed consent” in organ donation. International
Forum for Transplant Ethics. Lancet 1998;351:1650-2.
12. Kluge EH. Improving organ retrieval rates: various proposals and their
ethical validity. Health Care Anal 2000;8:279-95.
13. Loewy EH. Presuming consent, presuming refusal: organ donation and
communal structure. Health Care Anal 2000;8:297-308.
14. Siminoff LA, Mercer MB. Public policy, public opinion, and consent for
organ donation. Camb Q Healthc Ethics 2001;10:377-

Indian Govt. Laws for Human Organ Transplant

The transplantation of an organ from one body to another is known as the organ transplant. The person who gives the organ is called the donor while the one who receives is called the recipient. Organ transplant is done to replace the recipient’s damaged organ with the working organ of the donor so that the recipient could function normally. The person who is donating the organ (donor) could either be a living or a deceased.

Organ Transplantation is a boon to medical industry as it has helped in saving the lives of those who would have died otherwise. There are various laws that are to be followed while conducting the organ transplant. Medical India Tourism offers to give you online information on Human Organ Transplant Laws in India, India.

Kidney, Liver, heart, lung, pancreas, small bowel and sometimes skin etc. are some of the organs that can be donated for an organ transplant.

Due to inefficient and corrupt healthcare system, illegal trafficking of organ is really high in India. To stop illegal organ transplant, Indian Government has come up with a 1994 law that criminalizes organ sales. The Human Organs Transplant Act, 1994 has laid down certain rules and regulations that are to be followed while conducting organ transplant.

Organ transplant law does not allow exchange of money between the donor and the recipient. According to the Act, the unrelated donor has to file an affidavit in the court of a magistrate stating that the organ is being donated out of affection. After which the donor has to undergo number of tests before the actual transplant takes place. The Authorization Committee set up for the purpose ensures that all the documents required under the act have been supplied.

If it is found that the money has been exchanged in the process then both the recipient as well as the donor are considered as prime offenders under the law.

According to the Indian law, organ sales are banned and therefore no foreigner can get a local donor. Human organ transplant laws are very strict in India and the penalty incurred for organ trade is also very high.

According to the Indian Law, close relatives of recipient like parents, children, brothers, sisters, spouse can donate the organ without government clearance. But all other relatives who wish to donate the organ need to appear before the authorization committee for clearance and only after its approval and clearance can get the organ transplanted. (This has been now amended)

Kidney Transplant in Tamil Nadu India

Working towards ethical organ transplants by Sunil Shroff

The sale of kidneys is a regular scandal in India. A recent expose of yet another racket in the sale of kidneys in Tamil Nadu involved persons affected by the December 2004 tsunami. When some of them did not receive the money they were promised, they complained to the police (1). This is one more example of coercion and exploitation of people who are poor and the inability of the law to protect their interests.

The Transplantation of Human Organs Act (2) was passed by the Indian parliament in 1994 and subsequently ratified by the state assemblies. It accepts brain death as a form of death and prohibits commerce in organs. It limits the donation of organs without any legal restrictions by only the first relatives (mother, father, brothers, sisters, son, daughter and spouse) of the recipient. By accepting brain death as a form of death, the law was expected to use a large pool of patients for organ donation and overcome the shortage of organs, especially of kidneys. It was also expected to help develop other critical solid organ transplant programmes such as of liver, heart, lungs, and pancreas.

Since the Act was passed approximately 1,200 transplants have been done of various organs that were sourced from this pool; however donations have been sporadic and the numbers have not been able to cater to the demand for organs (3). This has resulted in a thriving trade involving commercial donors and middlemen. In most instances media reports have also indirectly pointed a finger at medical professionals. In a few instances the media have caught doctors unaware by using a hidden camera. Rarely however have any direct allegations been made.

Factors promoting the trade in organs

Two central issues related to the trade in organs need to be addressed: the effectiveness in implementing the current law, and the financial compulsions that make people donate their organs.

Sub clause 3, clause 9, chapter II of the Act gives room for unrelated transplant activity. It states: “If any donor authorises the removal of any of his human organs before his death under sub-section 1 of section 3 for transplantation into the body of such recipient, not being a near relative as is specified by the donor, by reason of affection or attachment towards the recipient or for any other special reasons, such human organ shall not be removed and transplanted without the prior approval of the Authorisation Committee.”

This clause has been grossly misused over the years. Patients with organ failure have used the clause to feel instant ‘affection’ for a stranger who is willing to donate his/her organ for money; later the same person may claim he/she was duped or not paid enough for the organ, and all the affection that was presented to the authorisation committee evaporates. Doctors often feel they need not object when the law provides a clause to help people whose family members refuse to donate, or who do not have a fit or matching donor. For the medical professional, the plight of the recipient may overrule all objections. Doctors have also argued that it is difficult for them to gauge ‘true’ affection and that this is the responsibility the authorisation committee.

The authorisation committees, when presented with such a case, look at the provisions of the law. They argue that if the recipient and donor pledge affection in front of the committee members, they need not object unless there is a complaint or some gross oversight. They argue that since the doctor sends such cases to the committee, it is the responsibility of the doctor to verify claims of affection.

Given these difficulties, should this clause be used as leniently as is being done at present or should it be tightened? Can we overlook the exploitation in the ‘affection’ that is obtained by the recipient or the middleman by luring a donor with money? MK Mani, chief nephrologist at the Apollo Hospitals in Chennai, writes, in a 1997 article, “The stalwarts of the unrelated live donor programme continue to do as many transplants as they did before the Legislative Assembly of Tamil Nadu adopted the Act. What is more, they do them with the seal of approval from the Authorisation Committee, and are therefore a very satisfied lot. The law, which was meant to prohibit commercial dealings in human organs, now provides protection for those very commercial dealings” (4).

We must also ask what circumstances compel donors to risk their health to donate an organ. Some case studies uncover the fragility of the economically poor communities of the donors. With reference to a study of why people in Tamil Nadu donate their organs, Madhav Goyal and his colleagues write, “Ninety-six percent of participants sold their kidneys to pay off debts. The average amount received was $1,070. Most of the money received was spent on debts, food, and clothing. Average family income declined by one third after nephrectomy (P<.001 and the number of participants living below poverty line increased. three fourths were still in debt at time survey. about per cent reported deterioration their health status after nephrectomy. seventy-nine percent would not recommend that others sell a kidney>
Ways to limit the organ trade

Organ sale or donation is a manifestation of poverty and desperation. The commerce in kidneys in India is linked to our socio-economic structure. An alternative is required, which can help to eliminate organ trade and overcome the shortage of organs. It is time to seriously think of ways by which we can promote the cadaver donation programme.

The cadaver donor programme could gain momentum with additions or amendments in the Act such as these (6):

  1. A ‘required request’ law that would make it compulsory for hospital staff to ask for organs in the event of brain death.
  2. A mandated ‘choice of organ donation’ clause in driving licenses issued in India.
  3. Undertaking post mortem examination at the same time as organ retrieval surgery in medico-legal cases. At present, after surgery for organ retrieval, the brain dead person is again subjected to a post-mortem; this causes unnecessary emotional trauma to already aggrieved relatives.
  4. De-linking hospitals where organs can be retrieved from hospitals where they can actually be transplanted. Moving bodies from a hospital that is not approved to another that is approved limits the number of brain dead patients made available. Such movement is difficult in brain death situations and its traumatic for the patient’s relatives.
  5. Making it compulsory to appoint transplant coordinators in the intensive care units of hospitals undertaking cadaver organ transplant, in order to identify and maintain brain dead patients. This transplant coordinator can be a senior nurse or a doctor

It is also necessary to ensure that sub clause 3 of the Transplantation of Human Organs Act is not misused. It may help to promote living transplant by:

  1. Strengthening and making the authorisation committee’s work more transparent by including NGOs representatives on the committee to help with pre- and post-authorisation counselling of kidney donors.
  2. Providing uniform guidelines to authorisation committees on how to interview donors and recipients.
  3. Recording the proceedings of the authorisation committee meetings.
  4. Authorising select labs to undertake tissue matching.
  5. Exploring possibilities of paired donations where a close relative or partner is fit and able to donate an organ but is not biologically compatible with the potential recipient. This couple can be matched to another couple in a similar situation, so that both the pairs in need of a transplant receive a matched organ.

It is important to set right the ethics of organ donation and transplant. At a time when cutting edge advances in health sciences relate to organ regeneration, tissue engineering and cloning, the ethics of kidney transplants is a test and will help us in addressing many medical ethical dilemmas in India.

References:

  1. Special correspondent. “Measures to prevent irregularities in kidney donation under consideration” The Hindu 2007 Jan 22. [cited 2007 Mar 9]. Available from: http://www.thehindu.com/2007/01/22/stories/2007012209350400.htm
  2. Government of India. Transplantation of Human Organs Act, 1994. Central Act 42 of 1994. [cited 2007 Mar 9]. Available from: http://www.medindia.net/tho/thobill1.asp
  3. Editorial. INOS and the essence of organ sharing. Ethics of organ donation and transplantation Indian Transplant Newsletter 2004: 5 (17-18): 1.
  4. Mani MK. Making an Ass of the Law. Letter from Chennai. Natl Med J India 1997; 10: 242-3.
  5. Goyal M, Mehta R L, Schneiderman LJ, Sehgal AR. Economic and health consequences of selling a kidney in India JAMA 2002;288:1589-93
  6. Shroff S, Navin S, Abraham G, Rajan P S, Suresh S, Rao S, Thomas P. Cadaver organ donation and transplantation-an Indian perspective. Transplant Proc 2003: 35, 15-7.

The author is a Managing trustee, MOHAN Foundation, Chennai and Hyderabad; professor and head of the department of urology and renal transplantation, Sri Ramachandra Medical College and Research Institute, Porur, Chennai 600 116, INDIA e-mail: sshroff@vsnl.com

RESULT OF THE AUTHORISATION COMMITTEE MEETING HELD ON 22.6.2007

RESULT OF THE AUTHORISATION COMMITTEE MEETING HELD ON 22.6.2007

UNDER CERTFICATE OF POSTINGS

K.Dis No. 43319 /MEII/2/07 Directorate of Medical Education, Kilpauk,Chennai

Dt. 22 .6..2007

Sub: Human Organ Transplantation Act 1994 – Authorisation Committee

Meeting for Renal Transplantation held on 22.6.2007– Result of Authorisation Committee

– Regarding

———-

Minutes of the Authorisation Comittee Meeting for implementation of Human Organ Transplantation held

on 22.6.2007 at the office of the Directorate of Medical Education,Chennai.10

2. The Authorisation Committee constituted in G.O.Ms.No.287 Health dt.5.5.97 for the implementation of

transplantation of Human Organ Act 1994 have examined the Donor and Recepient(duly verifying their photographs

and identification marks) have approved or not approved for the Renal transplantation as noted against each

case at the GovernmentHospitals /Private Hospitals who presented the case.

3. The Head of Institution should intimate the dates of surgery of the approved patient to this Directorate

(Patient and Donor Name and Date of Operation) After the Renal Surgery the Head of Institution should produce

the donor between one to three months before the Authorisation Committee for Health Check up and for assessing

the Health Condition of the Donor.

S.N

Name of the Hospital

Name of the Patient

Name of the Donor

Reconsideration

Result

Remarks

1

CoimbatoreKidneyCenterCoimbatore

Mrs.Razia

Mrs.Samiyathal

————

Approved

———

2

SriRamachandraHospital,Chennai

Mr.Ogolo Charles Eric

Mr.Ogolo Kingsley

————

Approved

———

3

SriRamachandraHospital,Chennai

Mr.Win Htwe

Ms.Ohmmar Myint

————

Approved

———

4

ApolloHospital

Chennai

Mr.U.Hla

Mr.U.Wai Pon La

————

Approved

———

5

SriRamachandraHospital,Chennai

Mr.Muguntha Kumar

Mr.Sabarinathan

————

Approved

———

6

ApolloHospital

Chennai

Mr.Giridharan

Mrs.Sagoundala

Donor does not know the post operative complications

Approved

———

7

ApolloHospital

Chennai

Mrs.Mani Sundari

Mrs.Selva Rani

Documentation are seems to be incomplete and Post Operative complication not know to donor.

Approved

———

FOR CHAIRMAN,

AUTHORISATION COMMITTEE

AND DIRECTOR OF MEDICAL EDUCATION ,

CHENNAI.10

To:

1. CoimbatoreKidneyCenter

738-B Puliakulam Centre

Coimbatore-641 045

2. SriRamachandraHospital

No.1.Ramachandra Nagar

Porur,Chennai 600 116

3. ApolloHospital

21,

Greams Lane

,Off

Greams Road

Chennai.6